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CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND 
PARTISAN POLARIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
RAYMOND J. LA RAJA 
The prevailing campaign finance system, as conceived under the 
1974 reforms, makes candidates heavily reliant on the most ideological 
elements in both parties. Regrettably, the conventional frameworks for 
understanding the dynamics of campaign finance have boxed us into 
reform solutions that are likely to intensify rather than attenuate 
partisan polarization. The ongoing emphasis on anti-corruption 
instigates rules that set contribution limits at unrealistically low levels 
for candidates and political parties. This situation compels politicians to 
redouble efforts to raise money from ideological constituencies. 
More critically, however, is a failure to see that the party system has 
strengthened to the point at which rules designed originally in 1974 for 
candidate-centered elections make little sense during a period when 
political parties are characterized by intense partisanship. The United 
States has a strong party system, but weak party organizations, in part, 
because of the candidate-centered design of campaign finance laws. The 
close seat margins for controlling government, as well as the policy 
distinctiveness of the major parties have dramatically raised the 
electoral stakes. Partisans therefore have strong incentives to mobilize 
collectively so as to maximize the likelihood of winning elections. In 
most democracies, party organizations are the essential vehicle for 
carrying out this task. In the United States, however, parties are 
constrained by campaign finance laws, among other institutional 
features. Ideological factions associated with the parties fill the breach 
in financing politics because both statutes and the Supreme Court’s 
election law jurisprudence confer advantages to non-party groups 
relative to party organizations. The result is a politics in which 
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ideological factions wield enormous influence in supporting favored 
candidates and setting the campaign agenda. 
Using an approach that incorporates an understanding of the 
institutional flow of campaign money, this paper argues that 
strengthening party organizations by making them more central in 
financing elections should reduce ideological polarization between the 
major parties. While such reasoning may seem counterintuitive, it 
reflects the realities of organizational incentives in the political system. 
Party organizations are uniquely situated to raise funds from diverse 
factions and invest them in relatively moderate candidates. For this 
reason, a party-centered system may attenuate polarization, while 
simultaneously improving transparency and accountability in elections. 
INTRODUCTION 
Politics in Washington appear hopelessly polarized. Political 
scientists are still trying to determine the underlying causes pulling 
the political parties in Congress and many statehouses toward 
opposite ideological poles. The dynamic is naturally complex, with 
potential links to social, technological, and institutional changes in the 
United States.1 One hypothesis gaining wide acceptance among 
scholars, is that partisan activists with strong policy preferences, rather 
than party professionals, have come to dominate political parties.2 
These activists have taken advantage of electoral institutions to 
recruit, nominate, and electioneer for like-minded candidates. As a 
result, public officeholders reflect the ideological position of often-
extreme partisan activists rather than the more centrist preferences of 
rank-and-file party voters.3 
This essay emerges from a similar strand of reasoning that 
attributes partisan change to the institutional advantages of party 
activists. Specifically, I argue that the most ideological elements in 
both parties have accrued significant power from American campaign 
finance laws and the jurisprudence interpreting them. Though such 
activists have always held disproportionate influence in party affairs, 
 
 1.  See generally Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Causes and 
Consequences of Polarization, in TASK FORCE REPORT: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN 
POLITICS 19–53 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013), available at 
Http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/Publications/Chapter2Mansbridge.pdf. 
 2.  See generally SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES (2009). 
 3.  This is the view espoused most notably in MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, & 
JEREMY POPE, CULTURE WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005). 
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the strategic benefits created by the campaign finance system, 
particularly since the reforms of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA), give them even greater leverage to pull parties 
towards their ideological poles. 
It has not always been this way. Three decades ago, campaign 
finance laws seemed tailor-made for a semi-fluid politics that allowed 
officeholders to pursue personal policy agendas. Candidates were 
largely responsible for raising their own money from personal 
constituencies that included friends and neighbors. Incumbents, of 
course, could draw upon the well of money provided by Political 
Action Committees (PACs) in Washington. Such PACs were mostly 
business interests seeking favors, particularly in the process of crafting 
the small-bore details of legislation. For the most part the closed 
nature of the system, in which campaign money flowed almost 
exclusively through candidate committees, gave candidates a 
significant degree of discretion in both their election campaigns and 
their time in office.4 
The political context in which the campaign finance system 
operates has changed a great deal. In the last decade, candidates have 
come to rely heavily on individual donors who often reflect the 
ideological outliers in American politics.5 At the same time, the 
patchwork arrangement of money rules gives rise to outside 
campaigning by narrow issue groups that pull candidates away from 
the mainstream electorate. In this essay I will explain how we arrived 
at this point and try to direct the way forward to a new approach for 
regulating money in politics. 
My diagnosis is that there is a severe mismatch between the 
design of the campaign finance system and the party system that has 
emerged in the past three decades. The current template for the 
campaign finance system comes from the 1974 amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act.6 This legislation assumed a world of 
 
 4.  I am not implying that this was a golden era of campaign finance. During this time, 
incumbents relied heavily on PACs to build campaign war chests in order to thwart potential 
electoral challenges. For this reason, it could be argued that system accountability was rather 
low during this period. 
 5.  George Soros and Sheldon Adelson are notable examples of such individuals. See 
Thomas B. Edsall, Sheldon Adelson: GOP’s Answer to George Soros?, HUFFINGTON POST, 
(Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/25/sheldon-adelson-gops-
answ_n_114899.html 
 6.  See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9031–9042 (West 2014)). 
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candidate-centered politics in which candidates largely controlled 
their electoral destinies through the self-management of campaigns.7 
This is no longer the reality. Today, parties and partisanship matter a 
great deal more than at any point in the last century. And yet our 
approach to campaign finance rules has not adapted to this new 
reality, a fact revealed by the outdated design of the most recent 
reforms of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Indeed, our 
conventional frameworks for understanding the dynamics of 
campaign finance have boxed us into reform solutions that are likely 
to intensify rather than attenuate partisan polarization. 
In Part I, I elaborate my argument for how the current approaches 
to campaign finance have been based on wrongful assumptions about 
the nature of the party system and why a party-centered approach to 
campaign finance might attenuate partisan polarization. In Part II, I 
describe briefly how the party system has changed from a candidate-
centered system to a strong party system and why this matters in the 
design of campaign finance laws. Part III then explains distortional 
consequences on the flow of money in a strong party system with a 
candidate-centered design of campaign finance laws. Part IV shows 
the different goals that motivate political groups and individual 
donors, and how ideological factions use their leverage in the 
campaign finance system to make political parties more extreme. Part 
V explains the consequences for partisan polarization of continuing 
on the same path of campaign finance reform, and turns to potential 
solutions to attenuate the influence of extremist factions in the 
political parties. 
I.  A FLAWED APPROACH TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
My overarching proposition is that the party system has 
dramatically changed in ways that thwart the logic of the candidate-
centered campaign finance system. Compared to the 1970s, the major 
parties today represent highly distinctive and almost diametrically 
opposed governing platforms. Moreover, any given election presents a 
realistic opportunity for either party to gain control of Congress. 
 
 7.  The candidate-centered nature of political campaigns have historical roots dating back 
to colonial elections. See PAUL S. HERRNSON, COLTON C. CAMPBELL, MARNI EZRA, & 
STEPHEN K. MEDVIC, GUIDE TO POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN AMERICA 19–20 (2005). The 
successful Progressive attack against party organizations in the 20th century, against a backdrop 
of changing culture and technology, helped move candidates front and center in the 
management of campaigns.  
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These two dynamics—policy distinctiveness and tight party margins—
can accurately be called a strong party system. Not surprisingly, such a 
system fuels intense partisan organizing to pursue majorities in the 
legislature. 
Despite changes in the party system, the campaign finance rules 
restrain the most important partisan organizer—the party 
organization itself. For this reason, partisans organize outside the 
formal party structure through non-party groups such as Super PACs.8 
The arrangement tends to benefit ideologically extreme partisans who 
have the means and motive to pursue high-risk, high reward campaign 
politics, especially when the policy and electoral stakes are high. Not 
surprisingly, these factions are unrepresentative of the larger party 
coalition because they either tend to focus on narrow “hot button” 
issues (e.g., abortion, taxes, guns), or they hold extreme positions on 
policies relative to rank-and-file party voters. The views of these 
extreme factions receive disproportionate attention from candidates 
precisely because such constituencies can instill fear or gratitude in 
those running for office. 
A recent example illustrates the problem. After a career in which 
Senator Pat Roberts behaved as a traditional Kansas Republican, 
seeking bipartisanship through compromise, Senator Roberts has 
begun aligning himself with the most conservative elements in the 
party after being threatened in the upcoming 2014 primary election 
by Tea Party activists armed with Super PACs.9 His fear is that he will 
be “Lugared,” suffering the fate of longtime Senator Richard Lugar 
(R-IN) who was deposed in a primary in 2012 by similar Tea Party 
factions.10 
Good government advocates are understandably concerned about 
efforts by political groups to circumvent formal campaign finance 
rules by setting up lightly regulated Super PACs and 501(c)(4) 
organizations.11 The primary response of reformers has been to devise 
 
 8.  “Super PAC” is a popular name for a type of committee that spends money 
independently of candidates and political parties. Unlike traditional PACs, which have 
restrictions on fundraising and the amount they may contribute to candidates or parties, Super 
PACs have no limits on the source and size of money they raise, and may also spend unlimited 
sums on elections. Being an independent-expenditure committee means that Super PACs may 
not contribute money to candidates and parties, nor coordinate their activities with them.  
 9.  Jonathan Martin, Lacking a House, A Senator is Renewing His Ties in Kansas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb 7, 2014, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/us/senator-races-to-
show-ties-including-an-address-in-kansas.html. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Types of Organizations Exempt under Section 
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ways to extend conventional regulations to such groups—disclosure 
requirements and restrictions on government contractors for 
example.12 Good government advocates have also promoted public 
financing schemes, such as “matching programs” to increase the 
number of small donors as a counterweight to large donors who 
finance outside groups.13 Both these approaches are shortsighted for a 
variety of reasons, but my purpose is to focus on how such practices 
will likely stoke ongoing ideological polarization. 
To address the problems posed by polarization it will be necessary 
to reconsider the orthodox regulatory approach—overwhelmingly 
focused on anti-corruption. Some legal scholars appear to be moving 
in this direction by broadening the meaning of corruption to 
incorporate goals beyond the prevention of quid pro quo corruption.14 
These efforts, however, will fall short of providing a necessary 
institutional perspective that takes into consideration how money 
actually flows through the political system. To be sure, conventional 
approaches are understandable given that campaign finance 
jurisprudence has revolved around conceptions of corruption. 
Nonetheless, I fear that viewing campaign finance through the lens of 
anti-corruption (however defined) leads to worn-out regulatory 
strategies that make the system hospitable to extremist party factions. 
The logic of anti-corruption implies an overriding goal of making 
politicians less reliant on big donors. To achieve this, reformers 
typically pursue a “leveling” strategy. At one end, this means shaving 
off big donations by imposing limits on contributions to candidates 
and, by extension, the political parties supporting them. At the other 
end, reforms aim to broaden the base of contributions by cultivating 
small donors to stand against big money. This similarly involves 
 
501(c)(4), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Types-of-
Organizations-Exempt-under-Section-501(c)(4) (last updated Mar. 14, 2014). This type of 
organization is commonly referred to by the subsection under which it is formed—a “501(c)(4).” 
 12.  Keeping Politics in the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at A22, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/opinion/28wed2.html. 
 13.  See Fred Wertheimer, Legalized Bribery, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 19, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/citizens-united-campaign-finance-legalized-
bribery-102366.html#.U8mAfZRdXrQv. 
 14.  There are several current healthy debates about the meaning of corruption. See 
generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Essay: Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct from a 
Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, (U.C. 
Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-94, 2013), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220851. See also, in this issue, Yasmin Dawood, Classifying 
Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2014). 
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setting contribution limits relatively low to force politicians to 
mobilize a broader swathe of donors, or to use some kind of matching 
system of public financing that leverages small donations. The 
regulatory strategy of using low contribution limits or publicly-
financed matching programs makes candidates rely heavily on small 
individual donors who tend to be highly ideological.15 In fact, when it 
comes to giving preferences, small individual donors tend to give to 
ideologically extreme candidates, in comparison to the mostly 
pragmatic PACs that typically give to incumbents, regardless of 
ideology.16 Overall, then, the reform strategy of promoting small 
donors appears to make ideological donations even more salient in 
the political system. 
A second problem beyond the anti-corruption perspective—and 
one to which I devote most of my attention here—is the faulty 
institutional framework applied to American elections and campaign 
finance. That framework is decidedly, if unconsciously, candidate-
centered—it no longer reflects the realities of the modern party 
system. This incorrect theoretical picture leads to reform proposals 
that bear no relationship to the dynamics of contemporary partisan 
electioneering in a strong party system. The resulting laws crystalize a 
dense but highly decentralized and fragmented partisan network of 
campaign activity. This structure makes it extremely difficult for 
voters or the Federal Elections Commissions (FEC) to bring 
accountability to political campaigns. In most democracies with strong 
party systems, the party organizations manage elections. In the United 
States, there is a strong party system but weak party organizations, 
resulting in heavy reliance on satellite organizations that work on 
behalf of party candidates. The candidate-centered design of 
American campaign finance laws has done much to stunt this 
traditional role of party organizations.17 
 
 
 
 15.  Adam Bonica, Forum: Leadership, Free to Lead, BOSTON REV., July 22, 2011, 
available at https://www.bostonreview.net/bonica-small-donors-polarization. 
 16.  See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of 
State Legislatures 6 (Sept. 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://static.squarespace.com/static/51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/52275a92e4b03f583b4b4047/137
8310802196/Limits.pdf. 
 17.  I discuss the history of United States campaign finance reforms and their deleterious 
impact on the national parties in SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2008). 
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The anti-corruption purpose (in combination with a candidate-
centered framework) is understandably difficult to move away from 
because it resonates with the public and is rooted in constitutional 
doctrine.18 On the other hand, my hope is that this essay will broaden 
the debate beyond purposes of anti-corruption—a strategy that has 
failed to improve accountability in the campaign finance system, 
much less attenuate fears that politicians are corrupted by big money. 
For those concerned about political integration and stability, an 
alternative reform agenda should balance concerns about corruption 
with an appreciation for the pivotal role of parties in generating 
broad-based governing coalitions that are willing to compromise 
internally among partisan factions and with the rival party.19 
My approach is rooted firmly within a political science perspective 
dating back to Edmund Burke, which values a strong role for political 
parties in making constitutional democracy workable.20 To some 
readers, my argument for strong political parties may appear odd 
when the very problem of polarization seems to be that parties are 
“too strong.”21 Paradoxically, I am arguing that strong party 
organizations are likely to decrease party polarization. The underlying 
theory is that financially secure and strong party organizations have 
centrist tendencies that will balance the voices of more ideological 
 
 18.  Public opinion polls suggest that Americans believe corruption is the primary problem 
in the campaign finance system rather than inequality of influence (i.e., distortion) in the 
political system, although it is possible that voters fail to distinguish conceptually between the 
two. Regarding constitutional doctrine, the Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 
(1976), and affirmed in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010), that the 
government interest in regulating campaign finance is limited to instances of preventing quid 
pro quo corruption or its appearance rather than addressing distortion issues.  
 19.  To be sure, others can reasonably argue that the political system should give voice to 
ardent conservatives and liberals who fall distant from the mainstream. Without denying the 
importance of having strongly ideological and non-centrist positions articulated in a democracy, 
this essay takes the position that such views are currently over-represented in the American 
political system, and that the moderating influence of large, coalitional political parties is 
essential in a highly diverse democratic polity, and one that has a constitutional order with 
multiple veto points, (e.g., as a result of separation of powers) conferring strong influence to 
minority viewpoints.  
 20.  See EDMUND BURKE, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in 
SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE (E.J. Payne ed., Liberty Fund ed., 1990) available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv1c1.html. 
 21.  Noted economists, R. Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane, blame strong parties and their 
monopoly on campaign finance on the polarization situation. I think they have it exactly wrong, 
as I explain in this essay. There is no “monopoly” because resources are dispersed among 
factions with different goals who want to influence the direction of the party. See R. Glenn 
Hubbard & Tim Kane, In Defense of Citizens United: Why Campaign Finance Reform Threatens 
American Democracy, 92 FOREIGN AFF., no. 4, July/August 2013, at 126. 
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factions in the party coalition.22 My argument makes sense if one 
conceives of parties as a network of partisan factions vying for 
influence to control the direction of the party coalition. Campaign 
finance rules allocate power within this coalition because they 
advantage some factions over others. Some factions, for example, have 
legal or election-related expertise that allows them to campaign 
independently of candidates, while political parties can no longer use 
soft money for similar purposes. Others have access to wealthy donors 
or organizations that can finance campaign advertising. Currently, the 
more extreme factions—many of whom have significant campaign 
resources and expertise—benefit from the party-constraining rules at 
the expense of the moderate factions that tend to control the party 
organizations. 
II.  THE CHANGING PARTY SYSTEM 
Research clearly shows that there have been significant changes to 
the American party system in the past fifty years.23 Specifically, the 
party system strengthened in ways that seemed unimaginable to close 
observers in the 1970s and 1980s who thought instead that political 
parties were becoming less meaningful in the political system. If 
anything, the evidence, even two decades ago, seemed to point in the 
direction of a weakening party system because Americans were 
affiliating less frequently with the parties. Parties seemed so irrelevant 
or unpopular that candidates often avoided using the party label in 
campaigns while party organizations seemed almost absent in 
elections.24 It is fair to say that an overwhelming number of 
incumbents in both parties felt secure in their reelections by 
practicing a district “homestyle” that downplayed the importance of 
party and cultivated personal constituencies.25 Given all these 
dynamics, this period could justifiably be called an era of candidate-
centered politics. 
 
 22.  This theory is related somewhat to that of Anthony Downs, who claimed that parties 
in the two-party system tend to converge on the median voter. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, 
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
 23.  Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party 
Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 83, 85 (2006). 
 24.  DAVID S. BRODER, THE PARTY’S OVER : THE FAILURE OF POLITICS IN AMERICA 182 
(1972); see also MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 
1952–1980 (1984). 
 25.  Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, & Morris P. Fiorina, THE PERSONAL VOTE: 
CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987). 
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It was also an expensive form of politics, at least when compared 
to elections in most other democracies, where political parties 
managed campaigns. Without traditional party organizations to 
subsidize mobilization, candidates created their organizations from 
scratch. They relied heavily on costly private consultants, media 
advertising, and polling technologies. The expense of campaigns and 
ongoing pursuit of political contributions attracted the attention of 
emergent public interest groups. Common Cause and like-minded 
organizations pushed for political reforms to broaden citizen 
participation and limit the role of money in elections. The Watergate 
scandal provided the focusing event that put campaign finance reform 
on the national agenda. In 1974, Congress amended the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA)26 to impose stringent and 
enforceable rules to thwart the money chase and reduce the reliance 
of candidates on big donors.27 
In many ways, the revised FECA was tailor-made for the 
prevailing candidate-centered elections. Contributions would flow 
directly to candidates who controlled their own election committees 
and took responsibility for reporting all transactions.28 To prevent 
corruption, campaign contributions from individuals were restricted 
to $1000 per election, while interest groups could make a $5000 
contribution through registered PACs.29 Notably, a political party 
could contribute no more than a PAC to its candidates, although it 
could spend an additional limited amount through coordinated 
spending on behalf of the candidate.30 
FECA institutionalized a candidate-centered campaign finance 
system that left parties with only a residual consultative role as 
service organizations.31 Not surprisingly, the big winners in this system 
were incumbents who came to dominate election financing in the 
1980s. They used the power of office to accumulate campaign war 
chests that gave them significant electoral advantages over 
 
 26.  Federal Elections Campaign Act, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified as 
amended at 3 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2012)). 
 27.  FECA was amended in 1974 and this version of the statute forms the basis of my 
analysis. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9031–9042 (West 2014)). 
 28.  See Id. at §§ 101, 202, 204, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263–4, 1275–78 (describing candidate 
reporting requirements). 
 29.  Id. at § 101(b)(2). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  PAUL S. HERRNSON, PARTY CAMPAIGNING IN THE 1980S 24–25(1988). 
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challengers.32 This financial firewall, however, could not forestall the 
underlying changes in the party system. In 1994, the Republicans 
surged to big victories by winning seats in conservative districts held 
by Democratic incumbents, mostly in the South and West.33 
The 1994 elections were pivotal in transforming the dynamics of 
the party system. As Figure 1 shows, prior to 1994 the Democrats held 
at least a fifty-seat margin in the House for decades. Since then 
control of the House has always been within striking distance for 
either party. The close margins make the electoral outcome of each 
seat important for every member of the party because it determines 
majorities in Congress and all the legislative advantages and 
committee chairmanships that accrue with such majorities. Small 
margins encourage members to support collective efforts by party 
leaders to win close races across the country. In practice, members 
became intensely active raising money for the congressional party 
organizations and complied with leadership requests to contribute 
funds from their own campaign accounts to targeted races across the 
country.34 The fundraising activities to help fellow partisans were 
added on top of their already prodigious efforts to raise money for 
their own campaign committees.35 
Importantly, the changes during this period did not simply reflect 
greater party competition, but the character of that competition. 
These contests were increasingly between party candidates with 
starkly different views of governance. Theories about politicians 
hewing to the median voter seemed increasingly irrelevant as 
candidates who were much further to the right or left than the typical 
voter won.36 Figure 2 uses the mean ideological scores (DW-Nominate, 
 
 32.  Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, 
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006). 
 33.  David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, Brian J. Gaines, & Douglas Rivers, The Perils of 
Presidential Support: How the Republicans Took the House in the 1994 Midterm Elections, 18 
POL. BEHAV. 345, 345 (1996). 
 34.  These organizations are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) 
and National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC). This willingness to centralize 
resources and authority played out in a similar way in the legislative process, as members gave 
leadership greater power to shape legislation and sanction rank-and-file members who strayed 
from party goals.  
 35.  See ERIC S. HEBERLIG & BRUCE A. LARSON, CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES, 
INSTITUTIONAL AMBITION, AND THE FINANCING OF MAJORITY CONTROL 40–41 (2012). 
 36.  Indeed, a kind of ‘leap-frog’ representation became apparent as the same district might 
be represented by a very liberal or very conservative candidate over a relatively short period. 
See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of 
American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 519–20 (2010).  
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first dimension) of party members in Congress from 1961 to 2013.37 It 
shows that both parties were sloughing off moderates and becoming 
ideologically purer over time. This was especially true for 
Republicans—not just in the South, but across the entire nation. The 
growing differences between the parties provided clearer electoral 
choices for voters, with important consequences for governing. 
 
Figure 1. Party Seats in the United States House, 1960–2012 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Distinctive policy agendas combined with close margins in 
Congress increased electoral stakes dramatically. The United States 
moved closer to a strong party system—one positively envisioned by a 
commission of political scientists in a weighty report called Toward A 
Responsible Party System.38 That report, however, failed to mention 
that such a system would also correspond to higher campaign costs. 
When policies hinge so greatly on which party controls legislative 
majorities, the value of each marginal seat increases significantly—
 
 37.  Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, & Howard 
Rosenthal, House Polarization 1st to 113th Congresses, VOTEVIEW.COM (Feb. 17, 2013), 
http://www.voteview.com/dwnominate.asp. 
 38.  See Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n., Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 3 sup. (1950). 
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campaign expenditures rise sharply. Figure 3, which shows spending 
on House races, reveals that this is exactly what happened during this 
period of party system transformation. Spending starts increasing 
sharply in 1994, when the Republicans abruptly put an end to 
Democratic dominance. Before the 1994 elections, the average 
campaign expenditures of challengers had been flat since 1974, even 
as incumbents enhanced their financial advantages. After this point, 
however, both parties had intensely strong incentives to finance 
challengers in closely contested races. Thus, we observe challenger 
spending rising at the same rate as incumbent spending. (Note 
however that incumbents continue to have an advantage under the 
candidate-centered finance system. 
 
Figure 2. United States House, Party Polarization, 1961–2013 
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Figure 3. Average Campaign Expenditures of United States 
House Incumbents and Challengers, 1974–2010 
 
 
III.  WHY SOFT MONEY? WHY SUPER PACS? 
With the stakes so high in this emergent party system, the 
incentives for organizing collectively grew. Party members needed a 
mechanism for channeling critical electoral resources to where they 
would be most effective for winning seats. The logical place for this 
activity is the party organization. However, FECA’s constraints, with 
its restrictions on contributions and coordinated expenditures, made 
channeling resources to the parties themselves problematic. Typically, 
national parties provide no more than 5 percent of campaign funds to 
candidates, on average (which includes both party contributions and 
coordinated expenditures).39 While political parties tend to focus their 
resources on close races, these direct contributions and coordinated 
expenditures never amount to a significant portion of total candidate 
financial support. 
 
 
 39.  To be sure, parties help the candidates in other ways though consulting and mobilizing 
voters.  
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The challenge for political parties was that the campaign finance 
laws made their situation progressively worse over time, even as the 
demand for party organizing mounted. One major problem was the 
failure of FECA to include inflation adjustments for both 
contributions to the party and contribution transfers from the party to 
its candidates. At the adoption of the 1974 reforms the parties could 
receive an individual contribution as high as $20,000. Twenty years 
later, in 1994 when the GOP won control of Congress, the value of 
this top-level contribution was just $6,600 in 1974 dollars.40 In other 
words, the party organizations had lost two-thirds of the value of a 
political contribution at the moment when the necessity of partisan 
organizing had become more urgent. The straightjacket of campaign 
finance laws designed with a candidate-centered framework proved 
costly as partisans sought new means to channel resources into key 
races. 
The rise of party soft money in the 1990s was a logical reaction for 
partisans trying to sidestep the impracticable financial constraints of 
FECA.41 Party soft money were funds that could be raised without 
source or size limits, so long as they were used for “party building” 
activities such as general overhead expenses, building voter files, and 
generic advertising to promote the party “brand.” Using soft money 
to electioneer for specific candidates was prohibited under federal 
regulations, but parties figured out how to produce ads that helped 
candidates in all but name, without violating the law.42 
Naturally, the flow of unrestricted soft money created anxiety 
among good government groups because the practice undermined the 
purpose of contribution limits. But rather than see the surge of soft 
money as a signal about institutional responses to a changing electoral 
environment, most reform groups responded by trying to put the 
 
 40.  Based on BUREAU LABOR STAT., CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited July 22, 2014). 
 41.  At the time, soft money was also exploited to get around the inadequacy of the 
presidential public funding system which was too inelastic to deal with the frontloading of 
presidential party nominations. See Raymond J. La Raja, Why Super PACs: How the American 
Party System Outgrew the Campaign Finance System, 10 FORUM no. 4, Dec. 2012, at 91, 92. 
 42.  To get around the statutes prohibiting electioneering, political parties simply avoided 
using terms such as “vote for” or “elect.” This enabled them to claim legally that the ads were 
about issues rather than candidates. Nonetheless, the intent to help a particular candidate 
seemed obvious enough. A report from the Brennan Center for Justice found that “96% of all 
party ads mentioned a candidate’s name or pictured a candidate’s likeness or image.” CRAIG B. 
HOLMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE END OF LIMITS ON MONEY IN POLITICS 3 (2001), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/f1b070cbd490336610_08m6bpvsf.pdf. 
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genie back in the bottle. In the reform rhetoric of the 1990s, soft 
money replaced PACs as the bête noire of campaign finance. 
The thrust of subsequent reform efforts was to restore the status 
quo ante FECA by plugging loopholes. For this reason, the approach 
employed an anti-corruption rationale and applied the 
conventional—and outdated—candidate-centered framework. 
According to political scientist Tom Mann, who helped shape 
BCRA,43 “[T]he new law is a relatively modest, incremental 
undertaking, not a revolution in campaign-finance regulation. Its 
major provisions would leave the system to operate largely as it did 
early in the 1980s. It is designed to repair the most egregious tears in 
the regulatory fabric . . . .” Reformers had failed to consider how 
much the party system had changed. By taking away party soft money 
and providing few alternatives for the party to finance candidates, 
BCRA squeezed party organizations even more than under the 
original FECA.44 
The main point is that BCRA failed as a regulatory strategy 
because it was stingy—limiting party organizations’ ability to raise 
and spend money precisely at a time when political parties as 
institutions mattered so much. Without party soft money, the natural 
response of partisans has been to devise other means to organize on 
behalf of party candidates. In the immediate wake of BCRA, soft 
money flowed to partisan factions, and the most aggressive ones 
sought to challenge the constitutionality of BCRA’s constraints on 
advertising with soft money by non-party organizations.45 Quickly and 
surely, the judiciary chipped away at restrictions on interest group 
advertising in a series of important cases that effectively started with a 
2007 decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life.46 Citizens United v. 
FEC in 2010 put the exclamation point on the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to countenance restrictions on spending money in politics.47 
The logical consequence of the anti-party design of campaign 
finance laws was an electoral environment rife with independent 
spending by partisan factions. As Figure 4 shows, the 2012 elections 
 
 43.  Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified at 36 U.S.C.A. § 510 (West 2014) & 
in scattered sections of 2. U.S.C.A.). 
 44.  BCRA “increased” the original $20,000 limit to $25,000, which was worth only $6,850 
in 1974 dollars.  
 45.  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (constituting multiple actions challenging 
the constitutionality of multiple BCRA provisions). 
 46.  FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 47.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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experienced a wave of new spending. More than 800 groups spent 
roughly $1 billion on outside advertising. In comparison, parties spent 
just $255 million.48 Notably, Citizens United was not the only cause of 
outside spending. Nonparty groups had started advertising 
substantially soon after passage of BCRA with as much as $234 
million in 2004 compared to just $34 million in pre-reform 2002 (both 
in terms of 2012 dollars). 
 
Figure 4. Non-Party Expenditures on Campaign Ads, 1996–2012. 
 
 
To illustrate the interactive dynamic between the party and 
campaign finance systems, Figure 5 shows in stylized form how 
political committees adapted during three different periods since the 
adoption of the 1974 FECA Amendments. The circles represent 
candidate committees; the squares are party organizations; and 
triangles reflect interest groups. The x-axis indicates, theoretically, the 
ideology of different sets of political committees, ranging from very 
liberal on the left to very conservative on the right. 
 
 
 48.  See Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (last visited July 22, 
2014). 
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Figure 5. Campaign Finance Dynamics: 1970s, 1990s, & 2010s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The top panel represents the 1970s, with its relatively weak party 
system and candidate-centered elections. During this period, money 
primarily flowed to candidates directly (incumbents mostly), 
illustrated by the relatively large circles. The party organizations 
played a small role in financing elections. PACs, however, emerged as 
key financial supporters, especially business-related interests, which 
are shown in purple at the center because they plied incumbents in 
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both parties. In 1980, for example, PACs provided almost half of the 
contributions to incumbent officeholders in the majority party.49 The 
other triangles reflect issue groups, tied closely to the party and 
possessing strong policy preferences. 
It is important to point out, once again, that the 1974 reforms 
institutionalized a widely acknowledged pattern of relationships in 
the party system. Candidates controlled their own campaigns with 
little interference from party organizations. Most members of 
Congress practiced their politics in the ideological middle, which 
allowed a good deal of bipartisan legislating. At the same time, 
however, incumbents faced minimal threats to their office because of 
their significant electoral advantage, not least of which included easy 
access to PAC money in Washington. 
Then, in the second panel, we enter the emerging strong party 
system in the 1990s and an incipient period of “party-centered” 
financing. Note that candidates are no longer near the middle of the 
ideological spectrum, and ideological issue groups play a larger role in 
elections because candidates need more partisan support. The party 
organizations, however, loom large because they exploited soft money 
to establish a dominant role in elections. Business-related PACs in the 
middle continue to support incumbents in both parties. 
Fast forward to recent years in the panel for years post-2010. The 
campaigns in this panel represent what I call “faction-based” 
campaigns. Partisan organizing remains salient because of high stakes 
elections, but instead of strong party organizations, we have strong 
factions (triangles at the extremes), wielding disproportionate power 
relative to other constituencies in the party. These partisan factions 
enjoy a larger role in the electoral system because soft money flowed 
to them rather than to the parties. To be sure, party organizations 
remain major actors within the network of partisan groups. Factional 
groups, however, have considerably more flexibility raising and 
spending money than the party organizations. Candidate reliance on 
ideological factions for electioneering affects the ideological 
distancing of the major parties (as I explain in the subsequent 
section). Notably, in my assessment the party organizations are more 
centrist than their associated factions. 
 
 49.  Data comes from the Campaign Finance Institute. See Campaign Fin. Inst., Campaign 
Funding Sources: House and Senate Major Party General Election Candidates, 1984–2012 at tbl. 
3-8, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t8.pdf (last visited July 22, 2014). 
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The panels in Figure 5 reflect a changing party system in an 
environment where campaign money streams went from being 
candidate-centered to party-centered, and then from party-centered 
to faction-based. I am not making the argument that the campaign 
finance system is the primary cause of political parties moving apart, 
but I am claiming that the legal environment for campaign finance 
advantages the ideological factions. In doing so, the rules make it very 
difficult for candidates to moderate their positions in the campaign 
and governing process. While party electioneering has always involved 
a network of partisan groups, the campaign finance system shrinks the 
role to the formal party organization (even if it remains the largest 
node) relative to partisan interest groups. 
IV.  GROUP MOTIVATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR IDEOLOGICAL 
CANDIDATES 
The 1974 FECA Amendemts were the institutional embodiment 
of candidate-centered politics during that era. This same institutional 
design, incongruously paired with a strong party system, now abets 
faction-centered politics. Financial resources are now pushed to 
partisan factions and away from the formal party organization. Some 
experts seem to suggest that this situation does not matter. After all, 
the political party is not simply the formal party organization but 
includes interest groups that typically support the party in elections. 
This “extended partisan network” can do the work of a traditional 
party through sophisticated exchange of information and 
coordination on electoral strategies.50 
However, being on the same party “team” hardly implies that 
coalition members agree on the direction of the party. Indeed, factions 
of the party might be united in their desire to wrest control of 
government from the opposing party, but they differ among 
themselves in their policy priorities. And because they have different 
concerns, they will have divergent electoral strategies. Factions with 
significant electoral resources will use them to push the party 
coalition in their preferred direction. A recent example is intra-party 
 
 50.  Conceiving of parties as extended partisan networks has grown out of recent interest in 
studying social phenomena through the lens of social networks. See, e.g., Richard M. Skinner, 
Seth E. Masket, & David A. Dulio, 527 Committees and the Political Party Network, 40 AM. 
POL. RES. 60 (2012); Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, & 
John Zaller, A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in 
American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012).  
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squabbling in the GOP, reflected in the fierce primary fights between 
pro-business Republicans and Tea Party conservatives.51 
To understand the different electoral strategies, consider the 
different motivations of groups vying for influence. The Venn diagram 
in Figure 6 indicates three kinds of donors based on three different 
political priorities. These priorities are gaining material benefits, 
influencing policy, and winning elections. Donors seeking material 
benefits from legislation typically reflect narrow economic interests 
such as businesses and trade and professional associations. The value 
of their donation is that it allows these groups to build personal 
relationships with members and their staff on bread-and-butter 
matters that are highly specific to the interest group. Most of the time 
such interest groups focus on shaping the technical aspects of policies 
(e.g., rules and regulations that might provide a competitive 
advantage) rather than changing the broad direction of policy. These 
organizations invariably receive the most attention from the media 
because they comprise the biggest bloc of interests, and because the 
pursuit of economic benefits through lobbying raises suspicions about 
quid pro quo corruption. Indeed, campaign finance reforms, which are 
based on the anti-corruption rationale, have been designed with the 
intent to limit the influence of groups seeking material benefits. Such 
groups are what most Americans picture when they think of 
corruption in politics. 
The second group—policy donors—represent fewer organizations 
and donate less money overall. This group, however, is increasingly 
influential in the emerging party system because such organizations 
occupy key positions in the extended partisan network and willingly 
spend soft money to shape electoral outcomes. These donors want to 
fundamentally remake government policies on key social and 
economic issues. The group includes single-issue advocacy 
organizations that focus on issues such as abortion, guns, taxes, and 
the environment. In the Democratic Party it includes many labor 
unions.52 Invariably, these factional organizations take positions that 
diverge from the median voter. Rather than using their donations to 
 
 51.  Janet Hook, Tea Party Faces Test of Its Clout in Primaries, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2013, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023048347045794014805826538 
14?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories. 
 52.  Labor unions might be considered a hybrid group because they seek both broad policy 
change and material benefits.  I associate them primarily with issue groups because their donor 
strategies are highly partisan, and they tend to support the most liberal members of the party 
who seek broad policy change. 
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persuade indifferent officeholders to champion their policy goals, they 
typically pursue an aggressive electoral strategy. In practice, this 
means they give to like-minded challengers as a way of putting 
legislators in office who support their minority views. It also means 
supporting incumbents who strongly believe in their goals. 
The third group reflects donors who want to win elections. Though 
it contains the fewest number of organizations, this group is 
nonetheless central to the political system in the view of political 
scientists.53 Organizations that focus on winning elections and holding 
power are associated with party organizations. They run candidates 
for office and organize partisan officeholders into a legislative caucus. 
Because the party is primarily concerned with holding power they 
want to maximize the chances of victory. 
 
Figure 6. Donor Motivations. 
 
 
The typology above reflects goals that will shape how groups 
behave in the campaign finance system.54 With respect to supporting 
candidates, each type might prefer candidates with more or less 
 
 53.  V. O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1964); E. E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942). 
 54.  In reality, organizations pursue several goals at the same time. Partisan interest groups 
also want to win elections, and business firms or parties have policy preferences. Indeed, the 
overlapping circles in the Venn diagram imply as much.  
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ideological extremism. Figure 7 summarizes how the three group 
types might distribute their funds. The x-axis displays candidate 
ideologies from liberal to conservative, while the y-axis shows the 
proportion of group funds that would be allocated to candidates 
based on their ideology. 
In the first panel, political parties are expected to give the greatest 
proportion of contributions to candidates in the middle of the 
ideological spectrum. This dynamic does not necessarily imply that 
party leaders naturally prefer moderate office holders. In fact, all 
things equal, parties might very well prefer to elect non-centrists. 
However, the overriding goal for parties is to win as many elections as 
possible. To do this, parties will concentrate their resources on the 
most competitive campaigns because their investments will have the 
highest payoff in these races. Since competitive districts tend to be 
ideologically balanced, strong candidates in such districts tend to be 
those who are able to appeal to moderate “swing voters.” Thus, when 
parties prioritize candidates running in competitive races, they also 
tend to be prioritizing an investment in moderate candidates. 
 
Figure 7: Expected Contributions Patterns Among Three Types of 
Donors 
 
 
The second panel represents how issue donors are expected to 
distribute their funds across the ideological spectrum. These “policy-
demanders” will focus resources at the tail ends of the ideological 
distribution where candidates match their own preferences, 
depending on whether they are liberal or conservative policy groups. 
These donors ideally want to support a candidate who comes closest 
to their preferences but still has a good chance of winning. In this way, 
policy donors are more willing to take risks than are political parties 
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that put a premium on winning elections. 
Finally, among material benefit donors we expect a distributional 
curve that gives most resources to moderates who are amenable to 
bargaining and persuasion. Strong ideologues on either side can 
threaten the kinds of compromise that these donors (who seek access 
for the purpose of negotiating benefits) would like from government. 
However, because these material-oriented donors largely reflect 
business interests, they are likely to have a bias toward conservative 
candidates who are more business-friendly (favoring free markets, 
limited regulation, etc.). For this reason, we expect to observe political 
contributions to be somewhat asymmetrical across the ideological 
distribution with a larger portion of funds going to conservative 
rather than liberal candidates. 
In a separate paper, Brian Schaffner and I, using state-level data 
from the National Institute of Money in Politics, demonstrate that this 
is exactly how these three groups behave.55 Donors who put a 
premium on policy issues give to extremists, while those who seek 
primarily to win or gain material benefits give to moderates. The 
policy-oriented groups have gained an upper hand in the extended 
party network because of campaign finance laws that hamper the 
political parties and keep benefit-seekers in check. 
Policy issue PACs do not provide as much money directly to 
candidates as the access-oriented business PACS. Instead, they 
leverage their financial influence in two ways. First, they make early 
contributions and independent expenditures to favored candidates in 
coordination with other policy groups in the party network. These 
synchronized efforts during the initial stages of elections help 
ideological challengers win office.56 Second, many of these groups now 
 
 55.  Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance 
Laws Increase Funding for Moderates and Challengers?, Paper Presented at the 2014 Meetings 
of the Southern Political Science Association (Jan. 9, 2014) (available online at 
https://polsci.umass.edu/uploads/profiles/sites/la-raja_ray/SPSA-LaRaja-Schaffner-Parties.pdf).   
 56.  A select set of challengers received support early and consistently from a core group of 
organizations. On the Democratic side, these groups included American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, Service Employees International Union, American 
Federation of Teachers, EMILY’s List, Moveon.org, Defenders of Wildlife, and other 
organizations closely associate with the Democratic Party. On the Republican side they include 
the National Rifle Association, National Right to Life, Club for Growth, Americans for Tax 
Reform and the American Medical Association. There were no corporate PACs in these 
categories, although a few trade associations such as the National Beer Wholesalers were strong 
supporters of Republicans. See Bruce Desmarais, Raymond J. La Raja, & Michael Kowal, The 
Fates of Challengers in US House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting 
Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2014) 
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receive soft money from wealthy individuals to run abundant 
advertisements in both primaries and general elections, sometimes 
challenging the party organization, which cannot use soft money. 
Consider, for example, the recent efforts by environmentalists to 
stop the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, which would carry 
oil from the tar sands of Alberta, Canada through the central region 
of the United States. Environmentalists are a core constituency in the 
Democratic Party. Their most visible organizations include the Sierra 
Club and League of Conservation Voters. Lately, activists have 
assumed a more aggressive strategy than simply using their traditional 
PACs to support candidates. Hedge fund billionaire, Tom Steyer, 
declared it time for environmentalists to play “hardball” with 
Democratic politicians who favor the pipeline.57 His super PAC “Next 
Gen” supports pro-environment candidates in Democratic primaries 
and has gone so far as to jeopardize Democratic control of the United 
States Senate by attacking Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana who 
faces a difficult general election race.58 Steyer and his environmental 
allies believe it is worth scaring Democrats (even in an “oil state” like 
Louisiana where being pro-oil is good politics) in order to push the 
party to take stronger pro-environment positions. 
It is easy to see why environmentalists in the Democratic Party 
are willing to take electoral risks. To them the policy stakes are 
extremely high. Indeed, from their perspective the stakes are 
potentially calamitous for the global climate. These partisans cannot 
fathom why the party leadership would continue to accommodate 
business interests that want to stifle pro-environment regulation. In 
contrast, the party leadership feels that the environmentalist strategy 
is shortsighted because it potentially gives Republicans control of the 
Senate, which is a worst-case scenario for advancing pro-environment 
policies. 
The intra-party fighting and bargaining has always been part of 
American politics and its two-party system. What is particularly 
noteworthy in the contemporary campaign environment is how these 
fights take place in the open, in part, because partisan factions that 
champion policy issues have significant advantages in the campaign 
 
(manuscript at 15 tbl. 4). 
 57.  Alicia Mundy, Environmentalists Democratic Donor Plays Hardball Over Keystone, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304703804579383302200142502#. 
 58.  Id. 
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finance system. In the 1990s, the parties accepted soft money—much 
of it from business interests. This apparently shaped its moderate 
positions on issues that party activists cared about deeply. According 
to former Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, “[w]hen all the 
money went into the parties, the parties [had] kind of a homogenizing 
effect. People didn’t come out of there too far to the right or too far 
to the left.” Now, Hastert says, members are “looking over their 
shoulders” and “neurotic” because they are afraid of being attacked 
by a primary opponent with soft money support from the right or 
left.59 
In sum, partisan groups that champion issues have augmented 
power in a strengthened party system in which they can raise and 
spend unlimited money on elections. At the end of the day, the party 
coalition needs them, even if such factions tend to support more 
extreme candidates. 
V.  INDIVIDUAL DONORS AND PARTISAN POLARIZATION 
To combat big money and extremist politics, a common response 
from reformers is that campaign finance laws should encourage the 
broad participation of Americans in giving money. Drawing on the 
anti-corruption perspective, the proposed reforms attempt to “level 
the playing field” by setting contribution limits low enough to keep 
out “fat cats” and encourage “grassroots” donors. The contribution 
limits compel candidates to increase the number of donors, 
presumably creating a pool of contributors that more closely 
approximates the larger American electorate. By focusing on 
individual donors, moreover, the thinking is that PACs will have less 
influence on politicians. 
There is little doubt that federal candidates have turned 
increasingly to individual donors over the past several decades. Figure 
8 shows that candidates rely more heavily on individual donors today 
than during the 1980s. In 1984, for example, candidates received 47 
percent of their money from individuals. This percentage has steadily 
increased following the 1994 elections. In the most recent election in 
2012, 56 percent of candidate contributions come from individuals. 
The percentage of contributions from PACs has held steady, while the 
 
 59.  Erica Ryan, Hastert: Primary Challenges Making Congress “Kind of Neurotic”, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO IT’S ALL POLITICS BLOG (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs 
/itsallpolitics/2013/10/08/230256554/hastert-primary-challenges-making-congress-kind-of-
neurotic?sc=tw&cc=share. 
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percentage from political parties has declined. 
 
Figure 8. Sources of Campaign Funds, US House, 1984–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One likely reason for greater reliance on individual donors is that 
the value of a PAC contribution has declined precipitously since 1974 
when it was initially set at $5000 per election. Without inflation 
adjustments it is only worth a little over $1000 today.60 Tellingly, 2002’s 
BCRA inserted inflation adjustments for contributions from all 
sources, except contributions from PACs.61 The goal may have been to 
diminish the importance of PAC contributions over time. Yet the 
unintended consequence may have been to encourage the formation 
of Super PACs, which are not constrained by contribution limits 
because they spend money independently. 
 Another reason for the increased reliance on individual donors is 
that incumbents have been pressured by party leaders to raise money 
for the party and candidates who need it. The dynamic has increased 
dramatically since the parties lost the ability to raise soft money.62 The 
 
 60.  Figures generated using CPI Inflation Calculator available from United States Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. See supra note 40. 
 61.  See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (West 2014). 
 62.  HEBERLIG & LARSON, supra note 35, at 41.  
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consequence is that members are part of a “dues-paying” system that 
puts onerous demands on officeholders to call potential donors 
practically every day. Some estimates indicate that officeholders 
spend up to 20 percent of their time on fundraising and related 
campaign work (and two-fifths of them said it was not nearly enough 
time).63 Other studies suggest the amount of time dedicated to 
fundraising is a great deal more, especially for those facing 
competitive contests.64 The pressure to raise money, even for 
incumbents in relatively safe districts, is increased by fears of outside 
groups spending money against the incumbent in her own district. For 
this reason, incumbents do double duty on fundraising by 
accumulating money for the party and augmenting funds for their 
own campaigns.65 
This intense effort to mine individual donations adds to 
ideological polarization. Despite the desire to “broaden the base” of 
donors, the expectation that such efforts will make donors more 
representative of the American electorate rests on faulty assumptions 
about who is likely to give money. Regardless of the amounts they 
give, donors are rarified participants in American politics. Even 
expanding the pool significantly is unlikely to change its basic profile. 
Studies show that donors tend to be older, wealthy, educated, white, 
and male. Critically, donors also tend to be highly ideological.66 
The consequence of pushing candidates to expand their donor 
pool is that politicians must spend more time interacting with highly 
ideological citizens in their quest for campaign dollars. A simple graph 
makes the point. Figure 9 compares the policy preferences of 
Americans who do not donate with those who do. The x-axis reflects 
an index created by combining the responses of citizens on a range of 
policy questions from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
in 2012.67 Those who are “very liberal” tend to take the most liberal 
 
 63.  See CONG. MGMT. FOUND. & SOC’Y. FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., LIFE IN CONGRESS: 
THE MEMBER PERSPECTIVE 14 fig. 6, 24 fig. 8 (2013), available at 
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/life-in-congress-the-member-
perspective.pdf. 
 64.  See PAUL S. HERRNSON & RONALD A. FAUCHEUX, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 
CANDIDATES DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL TIME AND EFFORT TO FUNDRAISING (2000), available at 
http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/herrnson/reporttime.html. 
 65.  HEBERLIG & LARSON, supra note 35, at 41. 
 66.  Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological 
Polarization of Political Parties, 40 AM. POL. RES. 501, 509 (2012). 
 67.  See generally Steven Ansolabehere & Brian Schaffner, Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study Common Content 2012, HARVARD UNIV., 
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positions on various policies, for example abortion, wealth 
redistribution, taxes, and gun control. At the other end, the most 
extreme conservatives respond consistently to the most conservative 
positions on these issues. The distribution in the first panel shows that 
most non-donors are close to the middle on these issues, but have a 
decidedly liberal tilt.  Importantly, the responses are normally 
distributed, suggesting that Americans who do not make 
contributions do not appear to be polarized. 
The second and third panels look at both small and large donors. 
For purposes here, small donors are those who give less than $200 
total in political contributions during an election season at the local, 
state or federal level. The results in both panels are starkly different 
than the results for non-donors. The distribution of donor policy 
preferences is clearly bimodal. Most donors are at the extremes of the 
distribution with a relatively small group of moderates giving money. 
Notably, small donors look almost indistinguishable from large donors 
in their policy preferences. My point is that reforms aiming to 
stimulate grassroots participation should consider that such efforts 
merely tap into similarly minded citizens, even those giving small 
donations. Emphasizing small donations, be it through matching funds 
or similar schemes, is going to leverage ideological dollars no matter 
how it is arranged. Small donors are not, in the main, ordinary 
Americans. They are sufficiently passionate about politics to part with 
their money, much like consumers who spend on products they like. 
And with passion comes extremism, at least relative to the rest of the 
American electorate. 
Politicians now rely more heavily than ever on ideological sources 
of money. And trying to collect this money means candidates must 
tailor their messages to attract the attention of people willing to 
donate. In these circumstances, it literally pays for candidates to tout 
extreme views. Studies show, for example, that ideological candidates 
in congressional elections fare comparatively better raising money 
from constituencies outside the district, and candidates may position 
themselves ideologically to attract additional donations from national 
constituencies.68 When Congressman Joe Wilson shouted “you lie” at 
 
http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/home, (last visited, Aug. 24, 2014). 
 68. Bertram Johnson, Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the 
Ideologically Extreme?, 38 AM. POL. RES. 890, 891–94 (2010); Michael J. Ensley, Individual 
Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE 221, 222–24 (2009); James 
G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee, & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict 
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President Obama’s 2009 State of the Union address,69 donations 
flowed into his campaign coffers.70 To be sure, this was a highly 
publicized event. Yet even less confrontational members of Congress 
understand the importance of making hot button issues salient in 
their campaigns and view small donors as very ideological and 
partisan. According to Senator Chris Murphy, a freshman Democrat 
from Connecticut, “[w]hen I send out a fundraising e-mail talking 
about how bad Republicans are, I raise three times as much as when I 
send out an e-mail talking about how good I am. People are 
motivated to give based on their fear of the other side rather than on 
their belief in their side.”71 
 
Figure 9.  Policy Preferences of Non-Donors vs. Small and Large 
Donors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 377 (2008); Woojin Moon, 
Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and 
Applications, 34 BRIT J. POL. SCI. 611, 615–17 (2004). 
 69.  Rep. Wilson Shouts ‘You Lie’ to Obama during Speech, CNN (Sept. 10, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/09/joe.wilson/. 
 70.  Wilson Funds Reach $1 Million after ‘You Lie” Cry, Aid Says, CNN (Sept. 12, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/12/wilson.fundraising/. 
 71.  Ezra Klein, Small Donors May Make Politics Even Worse, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-08/small-donors-may-make-politics-even-
worse.html. 
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VI.  A NEW APPROACH 
To summarize, the design of United States campaign finance rules 
appears hopelessly stuck in a candidate-centered perspective. This is 
problematic because the emergence of a strong party system raises 
the salience of partisan organizing. Yet party organizations, the logical 
place for such organizing, are severely hampered in raising and 
spending funds. The constraints on party organizations open 
opportunities for extremist party factions that now exploit 
independent spending, while simultaneously compelling candidates to 
forage for money from highly ideological donors, both large and 
small. 
This dynamic seems to orient both parties in Congress toward the 
ideological poles of their coalitions. I focused on the House of 
Representatives but my arguments apply equally to the Senate. By 
elaborating an institutional, system-level perspective on how laws 
shape the flow of money, I hope to encourage others to rethink the 
purpose and design of campaign finance laws. 
The dogged persistence in pushing for anti-corruption strategies 
seems misplaced when old-fashioned corruption is not really the 
problem.72 Outside groups are engaging in intimidation tactics within 
their own parties. They are willing to punish politicians publicly for 
disagreeing with them. But this is the nature of party politics in a 
democracy. Indeed, policy activists already have considerable clout 
through their oversized role in nomination processes. However, the 
anti-corruption rules that push money away from parties confer 
additional favor on this narrow slice of activists who have the means 
and motive to browbeat party candidates through campaign 
advertising. Make no mistake, the campaign finance laws have 
conferred this advantage on them. 
Anti-corruption strategies clearly favor factions that pursue 
ideological rather than material goals. This is an old and ongoing story 
of reform,73 which echoes Progressive-Era efforts to rid the parties of 
 
 72.  The prevalence of the “anti-corruption” approach is somewhat understandable given 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on campaign finance. The Roberts Court has moved 
steadily toward a position in which prevention of corruption is the only permissible justification 
for campaign finance laws. 
 73.  See generally HERRNSON ET AL., supra note 7 (describing the general history of efforts 
to reform American election practices); Sidney M. Milkis, Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive 
Party, and the Transformation of American Democracy (2009); Henry Jones Ford. The Rise and 
Growth of American Politics; a Sketch of Constitutional Development (1898). 
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patronage via civil service reforms. And it persisted through the era of 
the 1960s with reforms to bypass party bosses and open the 
nomination process to rank-and-file voters through primaries. It is 
hard to argue these reforms were “wrong” because, in theory, we 
should desire a democracy in which the pursuit of self-interest does 
not infect policies that are meant to promote the common good. 
Unlike lobbyists for industry, policy activists tend to make universal 
claims about promoting public welfare in pushing for their preferred 
outcomes. But there are costs to this strategy of giving preference to 
those who promote values rather than interests. The issue preferences 
of activists are not necessarily representative of broader 
constituencies, and may even run against the material interests of 
citizens who would benefit most from government action. Consider, 
for instance, the predominance in campaigns of social issues such as 
abortion, gay rights, and gun control, which displaces discussions on 
the political agenda about jobs and education.74 
Campaign finance reform is an area in which the reformist 
impulse elevates issues and values over interests. The anti-corruption 
logic focuses on thwarting the influence of narrow material interests 
that could overshadow the public interest. This is not an apology for 
corporate interests, but a plea for making bread-and-butter issues—
jobs, wages, economy, taxes, pensions, etc.—more salient on the 
political agenda. If nothing else, bread-and-butter issues promote the 
politics of compromise, which is necessary in a highly diverse nation. 
VII.  IMPLICATIONS OF PURSING THE OLD PATH 
The implication of a campaign finance system weighted toward 
issues rather than interests is that polarization thrives (even if the 
campaign finance rules have not been the prime mover in creating 
such polarization). Politicians will be responsive to groups that have 
electoral resources and set the campaign agenda. There are several 
paradoxes here worth pointing out. 
First is that polarization of the parties probably makes politicians 
more accountable for their policy stances, even as it hurts governance. 
When parties adhere to distinctive policy positions, it is easier for 
citizens to know what each party stands for. And when politicians are 
attached to strong party brands, they have less room to pursue 
 
 74.  I am not arguing these issues are unimportant, but rather that the attention politicians 
give to them seems to be out of proportion with the preferences of most citizens. 
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personal agendas that stray from clearly-defined party positions. 
Democrats cannot easily cut deals through ‘giveaways’ to industry 
and Republicans cannot do the same with labor unions. Consider, for 
example, policy debates over the Keystone XL pipeline. Democratic 
politicians have been targeted in advertisements from their pro-
environment faction for being corporate lackeys. Or, on immigration 
policy, consider how Republicans fear being accused of giving 
amnesty to illegals by strident elements within their own party. The 
dynamic has left little room for middle-ground positions. 
Electorally powerful factions have helped create party brands 
with regard to policies on taxation, abortion, environment, and gun 
regulation. And their ability to make legislative deliberations highly 
transparent strips away the institutional insulation of deliberation 
found in most legislatures—insulation that politicians need in the 
process of finding bipartisan compromise. Politicians will have their 
tongues cut out for floating an idea that challenges the orthodoxy of 
an influential faction. The paradox, then, is that voters know clearly 
where parties stand on issues and can evaluate them accordingly. 
Nonetheless, the ability of parties to govern is diminished in a system 
of separation of powers that largely needs compromise to function. 
For this reason, we need to consider trade-offs in designing new 
reforms that balance accountability to party brands with the need for 
flexibility in governing. 
The power of extremist factions raises a second apparent paradox 
in the party system. The system is more extreme precisely because 
party organizations have lost power. The party organization, with its 
incentives to win elections, seeks the Downsian middle of the 
electorate. I argue here that making party organizations stronger by 
pushing more money through them would moderate our politics. This 
position is contrary to recent arguments made by Hubbard and Kane 
who claim the party monopoly on campaign money has made the 
organizations rigidly ideological and out of touch.75 That view is wrong 
because, as economists, they tend to view the party as a “black box,” 
failing to appreciate its coalitional characteristics and how factions 
contend for influence by their control over electoral resources. 
The third paradox of the current situation should animate the 
reform community to adopt a new approach. Politicians seem more 
beholden to big donors in the aftermath of political reforms in 2002 
 
 75.  Hubbard & Kane, supra note 21, at 127. 
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that tried to do away with soft money. Studies show that it is not 
necessarily corporations that are exploiting Super PACs in the 
aftermath of Citizens United, but highly ideological and mega-wealthy 
donors such as the Koch brothers.76 The Kochs, the Steyers and other 
moguls, did not need Citizens United to spend large sums in elections, 
although the decision may have given them more legal options. 
Regardless, politicians must be more sensitive than ever to the 
concerns of rich people who pour millions of their own money into 
election advertising. 
Thus far, the ideological and risk-seeking activists in both parties 
have been the most keen to exploit Super PACs. This, however, may 
change. As outside activity becomes institutionalized, corporations 
may find it more necessary—indeed imperative—to use Super PACs. 
Certainly, candidates have already turned to Super PACs as a means 
of electioneering.77 The ongoing movement to independent spending 
through Super PACs will shred any semblance of the closed system of 
campaign finance envisioned by reformers. The quaint contribution 
limits under BCRA will become almost meaningless. 
All this is a recipe for chaotic party affairs. It means a weakening 
of the party leadership’s ability to govern. Leaders cannot get 
members to commit to deals on tough votes because the members 
fear being attacked by outside groups, from which party organizations 
can provide little defense.78 A similar dynamic is playing out at the 
state level where Super PACs have been active.79 Fragmentation 
within the two major political parties, as Richard Pildes also argues, 
has negative consequences for governance.80 Others may disagree, 
 
 76.  Charles and David Koch, Kansas industrialists who give heavily to conservative and 
libertarian political causes. See, e.g., Nancy Benac, Koch 101: Some Basics on the Billionaire 
Brothers, (Aug. 23, 2014 9:25 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/koch-101-basics-
billionaire-brothers-25096137. 
 77.  Jonathan Martin, ’Super PAC’ Is Formed in Mississippi to Protect 6-Term Senator in 
G.O.P. Primary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/us/ 
politics/mississippi-super-pac-aims-to-protect-6-term-senator-in-primary.html  
 78.  Carl Hulse, Ads Attacking Health Law Stagger Outspent Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/politics/ads-attacking-on-health-law-stagger-
outspent-democrats.html?hp&_r=0. 
 79.  Byron Tau, Last Call for State Parties?, POLITICO, (Feb. 2, 2014, 6:57 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/last-call-for-state-parties-103559.html. 
 80.  Richard Pildes, How to Fix Our Polarized Politics? Strengthen Political Parties, 
MONKEY CAGE BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/02/06/how-to-fix-our-polarized-politics-strengthen-political-parties/. For counter-
argument see Seth Masket, Our Politics Are Networked, Not Fragmented, MONKEY CAGE 
BLOG (Feb. 14, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/02/14/our-political-parties-are-networked-not-fragmented/. 
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saying that parties are complex networks comprised of multiple 
coordinated interests. Proponents of this view appear to forget that 
not everyone in the network has the same goals. In many ways, parties 
are vehicles of convenience for interest groups. Groups in the party 
network stick together, not necessarily because they share the same 
goals, but because they believe sticking together increases the odds of 
achieving their particularistic goals.81 
VIII.  THE WAY FORWARD IS . . . GOING BACK 
Is there a better way? At the risk of re-fighting arguments over 
the passage of BCRA, I would argue we should bring back party soft 
money. Perhaps in modified form, such as imposing caps of $100,000 
per year on the amount that unions or corporations could give to the 
parties. In the United Kingdom, even with its strict political finance 
regulations, corporations and unions are allowed to give directly to 
the political parties.82 Indeed, 75 percent of European nations permit 
corporate contributions, including such hotbeds of corruption as 
Norway and Sweden.83 Similarly, more than 60 percent of European 
nations allow trade unions to contribute to parties. However, given 
the anti-corruption framework that has been used to mobilize the 
public around reform proposals, I am not optimistic about soft money 
returning to the parties. But it is worth considering if reformers also 
want to restore some transparency and accountability to the system. 
Let me be clear that a party-centered system, with or without soft 
money, is not going to make outside money disappear. Now that 
groups have experimented successfully with Super PACs and other 
outside forms of organizing, the restoration of a closed system of 
campaign finance is highly unlikely. Even so, a party-centered 
campaign finance system can attenuate polarization by allowing party 
organizations to occupy more electioneering space than they do now. 
Opening the system to a dominant role for party organizations 
potentially diminishes the influence of ideological groups because 
candidates will be less dependent on them. My preliminary research 
with Brian Schaffner on campaign finance in the states suggests that 
 
 81.  See JOHN ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995) (explaining why members of a party network remain 
united). 
 82.  Int’l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Is There a Ban on Corporate 
Donations to Political Parties?, POL. FIN. DATABASE (July, 18, 2012), http://www.idea.int/ 
politicalfinance/question.cfm?field=248&region=50. 
 83.  Id. 
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states where party organizations play a central role in financing 
elections appear to have less polarized legislatures. 
If this dynamic applies to federal elections, then we should more 
seriously consider the trade-offs in our approach to campaign finance 
reform. Restoring party soft money conceivably invites additional 
corruption, depending on how corruption is defined. But restoring 
soft money might also lessen polarization because it elevates the 
preferences of “material” interests relative to those of strong policy 
advocates. We need to think hard about whether curbing the 
contributions of those seeking material benefits is worth it, if those 
regulations augment the role of ideological extremists in the political 
system.84 A polarized system is one in which gridlock hampers 
government action and partisan rancor undermines public trust. One 
prominent study has argued that polarization is linked to greater 
inequality.85 There are also recent examples of publicly-financed 
candidates in Arizona that have held extreme positions on 
immigration and discrimination against gays despite the opposition of 
business interests in their party.86 The dynamics of party politics are 
obviously complex, but changing campaign finance rules to better 
reflect today’s strong party system can reduce polarization by re-
calibrating the balance of power within party coalitions. 
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-the-next-citizens-united-could-bring-more-
corruption--but-less-gridlock/2014/02/21/a190d1c6-95ab-11e3-afce-3e7c922ef31e_print.html, 
and Bob Bauer, Rick Hasen on the Tradeoff Between Corruption and Better Governance, MORE 
SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2014/02/rick-
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